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The Effect of Firm Characteristics on the Use of Percentage
Retail Leases
Authors: Gregory H. Chun, Mark J. Eppli, & James D. Shilling
Abstract: Choice of lease payments has been widely studied in the literature. There are threenot necessarily exclusive-explanations that have received attention. The first attributes the
choice of fixed versus percentage lease payments to risk-sharing preferences. The second
explanation views percentage-of-sales lease agreements as a way discriminating monopolists
can appropriate economic rents. The third attributes percentage-of-sales lease agreements to a
metering and bonding argument. This paper examines the proposition that the choice of
percentage retail leases is driven in part by managements' desire to circumvent the cost of
violating debt covenant restrictions. The evidence presented here supports the prediction that
retail firms with higher debt-asset ratios are more likely to adopt percentage lease agreements.

1. Introduction
Research on risk-preferences proposes that the popularity of a percentage lease
1

agreement is linked directly to risk-sharing preferences. The literature predicts this by making
two assumptions-that some lessees are risk averse and some lessees are risk neutral. The
literature would then say that risk averse lessees will generally prefer percentage lease
agreements, while risk neutral lessees will generally prefer fixed lease agreements. The former
occurs because the risk averse lessee prefers a certain income (after lease payment) to a risky
income, and the latter occurs because the risk neutral lessee is indifferent to a certain income
and an uncertain income and, hence, is willing to absorb the entire risk or uncertainty with
respect to retail sales demand (see Stiglitz, 1974). Both cases assume a risk averse lessor.
There are two difficulties with this view. First, risk-sharing models cannot explain why it
is only retail tenants and retail space where percentage-of-sales lease agreements exist.
Second, risk-sharing models cannot explain why a percentage-of-sales lease agreement
predominates in one area (inside the United States), while fat rental fees predominate
elsewhere (outside the United States). Why should it be that most retail tenants in the U.S. are
risk averse, while most retail tenants outside the United States are risk neutral.
Smith and Wakeman (1985) have used a metering and bonding argument to explain the
existence of percentage-of-sales lease agreements. Their contention is that retailers negotiate a
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percentage-of-sales lease agreement in order to bond the quality of common property at a
shopping center. Smith and Wakeman also contend ( p. 905) that a percentage-of-sales lease
agreement “provides the lessor/developer with stronger incentives to coordinate the range of
shops over the life of the shopping center in order to maximize joint profitability.'' Wheaton
(1999) uses a two period bargaining model to show that basing rent on a fixed percentage of
tenant sales insures that the tenant configuration which is initially chosen and then maintained
by the landlord is the same as the one which maximizes aggregate sales. This presumes that all
tenants pay rent based on a percentage of sales. Yet, in practice, rent agreements often vary
considerably from retailer to retailer, with some retailers effectively paying nothing but a
minimum rental fee and other retailers paying a minimum rent plus a fixed percentage of sales.
Brueckner (1993) develops a model in which landlords act as discriminating monopolists,
choosing an allocation of both space and sales that maximizes aggregate sales. It is argued that
tenants with brand drawing power pay less base rent and a lower percentage of their sales
owing to the customer traffic they are able to generate for other tenants at the center.
Conversely, smaller, less known retailers, who depend on passing-by traffic, will pay higher
rents. Brueckner's thesis is that percentage-of-sales lease agreements exist so that landlords
can incentivize their tenants to work in the interest of the center as a whole. A problem with
Brueckner's model is that it predicts the wrong sign between rent and sales.
An alternative avenue of research for explaining the existence of percentage retail
leases is to take an internal look at the tenants themselves. An argument could be made that
retail tenants like The Gap or The Limited structure their lease contracts to circumvent financial
constraints. Indeed, past studies have generally found that managers of firms with higher D/A
(debt-asset) ratios substitute from capital leases and conventional debt into equity and other
forms of off-balance sheet financing to minimize debt covenants violation costs (for reviews see
Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; and Christie, 1990). Generalizing
from such studies, this paper argues that a retail tenant may choose a percentage lease
payment over a fixed lease payment, because the former is simply charged to expense when
actually incurred and is not considered as a future lease liability (see SFAS No. 29,
“Determining Contingent Rentals''), while the latter is capitalized and shown either on the liability
side of the balance sheet as a capital lease (with a corresponding entry on the asset side of the
balance sheet) or is disclosed in footnotes to the financial statements as an operating lease
(see SFAS No. 13, “Accounting for Leases''). This happens notwithstanding the fact that
percentage lease payments can create a significant hardship for lessee firms if their net profits
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were to decline.
This idea leads to an obvious empirical implication (which is formalized and made more
precise in Section 2), namely that, retail firms with higher D/A ratios are financially constrained,
and so, are more likely to adopt percentage retail lease agreements. This conjecture (which is
tested in Section 4) has not hitherto been recognized in the literature. As to why, then, we do
not see, say, office tenants with high D/A ratios paying percentage rents, we blame it on the
problem of monitoring actual sales. How does one determine the amount of sales, for example,
attributable to an IBM office located in New York City versus an IBM office located in Chicago or
Los Angeles? The simple answer is one cannot, at least not very easily.

2. Hypothesis
To understand the role that firm characteristics play in the selection of percentage lease
agreements, it is best to investigate a special case of Watts and Zimmerman's (1986) positive
accounting theory. In their model, accounting methods adopted by a firm are systematically
related to certain characteristics of the firm and/or its industry. Basically, their argument is that
firm managers maximize their own interests (which tend to coincide more closely with those of
stockholders than with the interests of bondholders) by engaging in actions that will present the
results of firm operations in a most favorable way. This includes exploiting the accounting
discretion under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) to pursue growth objectives
even when growth does not benefit shareholders.
Empirically, there are a number of studies which suggest that management's
preferences with regard to accounting methods depend upon the relative income effects of the
methods. Watts and Zimmerman (1978), Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979), Bowen et al. (1981),
and Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) suggest that larger firms are more likely to choose those
accounting methods which will reduce (or delay) the reporting of income. Their argument is
based upon the belief that high accounting profits by larger firms are likely to lead politicians to
subject these firms to negative wealth transfers through regulation. Dhaliwal (1980) argues that
firms with large amounts of debt relative to equity will tend to choose accounting methods which
result in higher or earlier reported earnings because of the existence of restrictive debt
covenants. El-Gazzar et al. (1986), Imhoff and Thomas (1988), and El-Gazzar (1993) found that,
at least prior to the promulgation of SFAS No. 13, leverage was a significant factor in explaining
the choice of capital versus operating leases.
The purpose of this paper is to examine if managers of retail firms with high D/A ratios
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(which is our measure of financially constrained) are more likely than managers of retail firms
with low D/A ratios to choose percentage lease agreements, because percentage lease
agreements result in higher reported equity. SFAS No. 13 requires a retail lessee to compute
the present value of the minimum lease payments over the term of the lease using his or her
incremental borrowing rate, and to record that amount either on the liability side of the balance
sheet as a capital lease (with the gross amount of assets recorded under capital leases on the
asset side of the balance sheet) or disclose the amount in footnotes to the financial statements
as an operating lease. In either case, lease payments that depend on a factor like future sales
volume are considered contingent rentals in their entirety and are excluded from minimum lease
payments because future sales do not exist at the inception of the lease. More specifically,
SFAS No. 29 defines contingent rentals as:
Contingent rentals. The increases or decreases in lease payments that result
from changes occurring subsequent to the inception of the lease in the factors
(other than the passage of time) on which lease payments are based, except as
provided in the following sentence. Any escalation of minimum lease payments
relating to increases in construction or acquisition cost of the leased property or
for increases in some measure of cost or value during the construction or preconstruction period, as discussed in FASB Statement No. 23, “Inception of the
Lease,'' shall be excluded from contingent rentals. Lease payments that depend
on a factor directly related to the future use of the leased property, such as
machine hours of use or sales volume during the lease term, are contingent
rentals and, accordingly, are excluded from minimum lease payments in their
entirety [p. 4].
These important differences suggest that managers of retail firms with high D/A ratios
should be more likely than managers of firms with low D/A ratios to choose percentage lease
agreements, since percentage lease payments are not reported as a future lease liability
anywhere. Further, an argument can be made that percentage lease agreements may transfer
wealth from debtholders, especially since percentage lease payments can greatly affect the
ability of the firm to meet its current debts should net profit margins decline.
Based on this discussion, the following hypothesis is formulated:
Hypothesis. Firms with higher D/A ratios are more likely to be financially
constrained (and closer to debt covenant constraints), and so, are more likely to
choose percentage lease payments.
The remainder of this paper provides a direct test of the above hypothesis where an
attempt is made to add terms in the square of variables to allow for nonlinearities in the
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relationship.

3. Sample and descriptive statistics
To obtain our sample, we proceed as follows. We gathered data on 969 retail leases
written by two major regional shopping center developers in the United States between 1962
and 1990, inclusive. For each lease, we collected data on the minimum rent, overage rent, lease
term, age of lease, percent overage, actual sales per-square foot at the center, threshold sales
per-square foot (which is the sales level below which the lessee pays nothing but a base rent
and above which the lessee must pay a base rent plus a percentage of gross sales), tenant
square feet, and anchor (department store) square feet. We drew this data from 1990 rent rolls.
The entire sample consists of 100 different retailers located in 49 different regional shopping
centers throughout the United States.
Next, for each retailer in the sample (or its parent company) we collected accounting
variables from the merged COMPUSTAT annual industrial files of income-statement and
balance-sheet data. Among the variables collected were total assets of the firm, D/A ratio, D/E
(debt-equity) ratio, and net income. We also used the COMPUSTAT income-statement data to
compute the standard deviation in net income of each firm to test whether retail firms choose
percentage lease agreements when net income is uncertain. The COMPUSTAT data are for the
years ending on or before December 1989 so that ex ante characteristics are used to correlate
with the type of lease payment in 1990.
We then checked the lease data against rental quotes available in Dollars and Cents of
Shopping Centers (1990). The lease data were also passed through filters examining minimum
rents, overage rents, lease term, age of lease, percent overage, actual sales per-square foot at
the center, and threshold sales per-square foot. The most usual filter appeared to be the check
on reported sales. Any observations with missing retail sales were deleted. Moreover, any
irregularity in the pattern of minimum rents and overage rents (e.g., where minimum rent was
more than total rent) was checked. The latter event occurred in very few cases. In general, the
relatively close agreement on rental rates between our sample and Dollars and Cents of
Shopping Centers is considered a positive aspect of the data.
The sample is disaggregated by merchandise type to provide some information on the
use of percentage leases. Where actual sales are difficult to monitor (e.g., for commercial banks,
residential real estate brokers, travel agents, etc.), we expect the use of percentage leases to
be lower than that of fixed leases. Further, we expect D/A ratios and lease arrangements to vary
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considerably from retailer to retailer. The Gap, for example, operates 960 stores under three
brand names: Gap, GapKids, and Banana Republic. The Gap uses virtually no long-term debt in
its capitalization and instead uses leased premises to facilitate its retail activities. In 1989 (a
year before our sample begins), The Gap's total minimum rent and interest payments were
$88.4 million dollars (or 6.0 percent of net sales). Additionally, payments on contingent rentals
totaled $20.5 million, raising The Gap's total rent and debt costs to 7.0 percent of net sales.
The Melville Corporation provides another example of a retail company that makes
heavy use of both off-balance-sheet lease liabilities and contingent rentals. The Melville
Corporation is one of the largest specialty retail companies in the United States. Through its
subsidiaries, Melville operates over 6,900 retail stores under various trade names, including
CVS, Marshalls, Thom McAn, Linens'n Thing, Pay Less Drug, Accessory Lady, Chess King,
among others. Melville uses operating leases to operate its retail businesses with a small
number of capital leases. In 1989, Melville's interest expense and minimum rent combined to
total $299 million (or 4.0 percent of net sales). In comparison, contingent rentals were $204
million, which consisted principally of rentals for leased shoe departments operated under
license agreements with Kmart.
While on the subject, The Limited provides an example of a retail company that makes
relatively little use of contingent rentals. The Limited is principally engaged in the purchase,
distribution, and sale of women's apparel. The company's retail divisions include Express, The
Limited, Lerner, Victoria's Secret (subsequently spun off in a 1996 initial public offering), among
others. The company maintains several lines of credit as well as several notes totaling $445.7
million. A substantial portion of the company's leased facilities have initial terms ranging from 10
to 20 years. In 1989, The Limited's minimum rent obligations were $248 million. In contrast, its
contingent rents were only $27.1 million (combined total lease obligations and interest payments
were $324 million dollars or 7.0 percent of net sales).
Musicland is another retail company that makes relatively little use of contingent rentals.
Musicland operates 874 retail outlets under the names Musicland, Sam Goody, and Sun Coast
Motion Picture Company, all of which sell either music and home video products. While
Musicland's minimum rent obligations in 1989 were $48.6 million, its contingent rents were only
$5.8 million. Interestingly, the combined total rent obligations and interest expense for
Musicland in 1989 was 14.6 percent of sales, approximately twice the rate of The Limited.
Other examples of companies included in the sample are Liz Clairborne, Inc., Oxford
Industries, and T.J.X. Companies. Liz Clairborne, Inc. designs, contracts for the manufacture of,
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and markets an extensive range of women's apparel and accessories, men's sportswear and
furnishings and women and men's fragrance products. Liz Clairborne, Inc. operates over 50
retail outlets under the names First Issue and Liz Clairborne. Oxford Industries designs,
manufactures, and sells consumer apparel products for men, women, and children under the
names Lanier Clothes, Oxford Shirtings, Oxford Slacks, Jhane Barnes, and B.J. Designs; and
markets directly to customers through its Oxford Street outlets. T.J.X. Companies is the largest
off-price apparel retailer in the United States, comprised of the T.J. Maxx and Hit or Miss chains.
Liz Clairborne, Oxford Industries, and T.J.X. Companies are interesting because all three
retailers tend to select nothing but fixed rental lease agreements.
Table 1 presents data on the number of observations, the average minimum rent,
overage rent, total rent, actual sales per-square foot at the center, and the ratio of the threshold
to actual sales per-square foot by size of tenant ( per-square foot). We expect larger tenants to
have some degree of market power in the market for leasing retail space (which they use to
negotiate reduced rents, either in the form of reduced overages or lower base rents, or both).
We also expect larger tenants to generate an externality effect that increases retail sales at the
center (which causes self-interested landlords to lower the rents that they are willing to charge).
The significance of this shown in Table 1. The data show that there is substantial variation in
rent payments by size of store. Also the data show that overages are paid on about one third of
the leases, but account for a relatively small amount (only about 9 percent) of total rent (see
columns (5) and (6)).
Before shifting the focus of the discussion from leases to retailers, it is instructive to note
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that virtually all retail leases are structured as operating leases. The lease period is typically
short-term (between 10 and 11 years), and the estimated economic life of a regional shopping
center is long-term (between 40 and 50 years). We should also point out that smaller retailers
are generally forced by lessors to lease for a 10-year period, even though the economic life of
this class of store is about 5 years. Also, virtually all retail leases fall within the non-cancelable
category. We can assume that this occurs to allow the lessor to finance the asset.
We now turn to the distribution of retailers by D/A ratio. The mean D/A ratio for the
retailers is 0.48. The lowest D/A ratio is 0.17 and the highest D/A ratio is 0.71. The average firm
size is $2 billion. The biggest firms in our final sample (more than $1 billion in total assets) are
Kmart, JC Penney's, Sears and Roebuck, Woolworth Corp., the Melville Corporation, The
Limited, the Walgreen Co., and Rite Aid (all of which, with the possible exception of the Melville
Corporation, which we have already talked about, are household names). The smallest firms in
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our final sample (less than $150 million in total assets) are Claire's Stores, Inc., a women's
accessory and specialty store, which engages in the sale of fashion accessories, costume
jewelry, handbags, and other related apparel, Martin Lawrence, Ltd., which is an integrated
publisher, retailer, and wholesaler of serigraphs, lithographs, sculpture and other original works
of art, and Piccadilly Cafeterias, which operates cafeterias in the southern and southwestern
regions of the United States. Most firms have, however, between $150 and $300 million (in
1989 dollars) in total assets.
Table 2 shows that in our sample of 100 retailers, most make heavy use of conventional
debt (42 percent have D/A ratios in excess of 0.50). Another 56 percent have D/A ratios
between 0.25 and 0.50. The majority of this debt tends to be short-term or intermediate-term
3

(either bank financing or trade credit), and is used to carry inventories.
Table 2 also shows that there are differences in D/A ratios by merchandise type. The 14
merchandise types are (1) family apparel, (2) specialty apparel, (3) men's wear, (4) women's
wear, (5) women's specialty apparel, (6) shoes, (7) gifts and cards, (8) jewelry, (9) restaurants,
(10) home furnishings, (11) leisure and entertainment, (12) drug and variety, (13) services and
optical, and (14) other. Each of these categories is generally self explanatory. For example,
included among men's apparel stores are Chess King, Oxford Street, and Richman Brothers.
Included among women's apparel are Lerner Shops and Susie's Casuals, and so on. The other
category includes stores like Jo-Ann Fabrics, Minnesota Fabrics, and Sears Key and
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Engraving. Looking at the table, we see here that men's apparel, gifts and cards, and drug and
variety tend to have some of the lowest D/A ratios (second perhaps only to home furnishings,
services and optical, and other). This suggests that men's apparel, gifts and cards, and drug
and variety should have among the lowest use of percentage lease agreements (see below).
Too few observations prevented us from doing these tests for home furnishings, services and
5

optical, and other.
4. Probit analysis of the relationship between the use of percentage lease
agreements and firm characteristics
We explore the relationship between the use of percentage lease agreements and firm
characteristics in a probit regression framework. We use two criteria to define the use of
percentage leases. The first is whether current sales are greater than the threshold sales
breakpoint (which, as reported in Section 3, occurs in about one-third of the leases). Our second
criteria strengthens this definition, by looking at the likelihood that the overage clause will be in8 Chun, Eppli, & Shilling

the-money at some point in time over the entire term of the lease. We simulate this possibility by
assuming that retail sales grow at an average annualized rate of 4 percent per year over time.6
We then compare simulated and threshold sales on each lease for each retailer to determine
when a percentage lease agreement has been selected and when a fixed lease agreement has
been chosen.
We then define  ,  to be a pair of response variables for each retailer (which is our
unit of observation). The value of the first variable,  , is the number of percentage leases (or
events) selected (which we estimate in the two ways discussed above). The value of the second
variable,  , is the number of leases negotiated (or trials), and the ratio of  to  is between 0
7

and 1, inclusive.
Next we let  be a theoretical (but not actually measured) index that determines when a
percentage lease agreement is selected. For each retailer, we assume that a percentage lease
agreement will be selected when 

 . Further, we assume that  is a normally distributed

random variable, so that the probability of selecting a percentage lease agreement is equal to
the probability that  is less than (or equal to) to  , which equals  , · being the
cumulative distribution function of a standard normal variate. Since  is measured by the
area under the standard normal curve from -∞ to , the event will be more likely to occur the
larger the value of the index  .
We model  as
 

  | 
 

    ⁄   ⁄    ⁄

 ⁄    ASSET" b$ ASSET"% 
& SIZE%  b) SIZE%   Σ+,
./ /
0 1
2  1,2, … , 6

(1)

where  = the number of events (in-the-money percentage leases) for each retailer;  =
the number of trials for each retailer; ⁄ = debt-asset ratio; the numerator includes total onbalance sheet liabilities; ⁄ = debt-equity ratio; ""7 = the value of the firm's assets
(measured in millions of dollars); "8 = average tenant size (as a percent of anchor
department store size); / = 0-1 indicator variable for merchandize type; 1 = the standard
deviation of income; and n = the number of different retailers.
Here, the parameters a, b1, b2, ..., b9, and ./ determine the critical cutoff value of  and
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the event that 

 .

The probit results of estimating (1) are reported in Table 3. We use three different model
specifications. Model 1 includes all balance-sheet variables and three merchandise dummies.
Model 2 adds average tenant size (this measure causes different rankings of retailers than by
the value of the firm's assets). Model 3 adds average tenant size and the standard deviation of
income. The latter variable introduces a potential errors in variables problem into the probit
calculation procedure (since there are no hard-and-fast rules as to how the standard deviation
of income should be measured). Fortunately, the model is robust to the calculation of the
standard deviation of income.
The results in Table 3 indicate (as expected) a positive relationship between the choice
of a percentage lease agreement and D/A ratios. Here the coefficient of the D/A ratio term is
always positive and statistically significant, regardless of the criteria used to define  (t-ratios
appear in parentheses). The coefficient of the D/A ratio squared term, however, is statistically
significant only when  is defined based on current sales (see columns (1)-(3)). When  is
defined based on current and future sales (see columns (4)-(6)), the coefficient of the D/A ratio
squared term is negative and insignificant, suggesting that the linear form for the D/A ratio may
be acceptable.
A few other patterns are evident in Table 3. Generally, the coefficients of the D/E ratio
term and the D/E ratio squared term are too imprecisely estimated to place much confidence in
them. The two exceptions are with the coefficient of the D/E ratio term in column (3) and the
coefficient of the D/E ratio squared term in columns (4) and (5). Here the coefficient estimates
are positive (as would be expected), and significantly so.
The effects of firm assets are presented next. For four out of the six probits, there is a
negative relationship between firm assets and percentage leases. In two of these cases, the
coefficient of firm assets is negative and significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level. We
find the coefficient of firm assets squared is insignificantly different from zero in five out of the
six probits. Overall, the interpretation of these results is that larger firms generally use less
percentage leases. This is likely due to the fact that larger tenants have market power in
8

negotiating leases and greater financial stability.
If we were to perform t-tests on the individual coefficients of the three terms involving 0-1
variables, we would consistently find the first negative and significant in all six probits (at the
0.05 level), the second negative and significant when  is defined based on current and future
sales, and the third negative but insignificant. These results are consistent with the low D/A
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ratios in Table 2.
One would expect the coefficient of the tenant size term to be positive and the coefficient
of the tenant size squared term to be negative, so that the choice of percentage leases
decreases as tenant size increases (which is what we find). This type of story is consistent with
the fact that larger tenants generate externalities, and with the evidence that larger tenants
usually receive subsidized fixed lease agreements to locate at the center.
The results also show a positive and significant relationship (as expected) between the
standard deviation of net income and the use of percentage leases. Such incentives exist
because the use of fixed leases can easily increase the probability of negative income beyond
the point that the tenant is willing to tolerate, especially if net income is extremely volatile.

5. Concluding discussion
Our concern here has been with the idea that a retail firm may choose a percentage
lease agreement over a fixed lease agreement because percentage lease payments are
charged as an expense when incurred and not reported as a future lease liability, while fixed
lease payments are reported as a future lease liability. The analysis was motivated by the
theory contained in Watts and Zimmerman (1986). We adopted this setting to the choice of
percentage lease payments, specifically noting that percentage lease payments can create a
significant hardship for lessee firms if their net profits were to decline. The empirical prediction
of our analysis was that retail firms with higher D/A ratios are more likely to be financially
constrained or more likely to be closer to debt covenant constraints, and so, are more likely to
choose percentage lease payments.
We then examined empirically a large sample of retail lease agreements and the
relationship between the choice of percentage lease agreements and leverage ratios of the
companies. Our findings, which seem to be the first systematic data on this basic topic, were
generally supportive of the view that managers of retail firms with high D/A ratios choose
percentage lease agreements. This analysis raises questions about past attempts to explain the
choice of lease payments, at least when the justification for choosing a percentage-of-sales
lease agreement rests in part on a risk-sharing argument or in part on a metering and bonding
argument.

Notes
1. The literature on risk-sharing in percentage leases dates back more than a century
ago to classical economists like Adam Smith, and, later, to Alfred Marshall (1890), and then
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to Johnson (1950) and Cheung (1969).
2. Essentially, operating leases give the lessee the right to use the leased property
over a period of time but they do not give the lessee all of the benefits and risks that are
associated with the asset (see SPAS No. 13).
3. Most retailers at certain times of the year invest large sums of money (typically
between 40 and 50 percent of their total assets) in merchandise (often to purchase goods
for an entire season), whereas at other times, only small sums are needed to pay business
expenses. Commercial banks are the largest single source for short-term and intermediateterm loans for retailers, followed by trade credit. Factoring is also used by retailers to ease
the burden of credit and collections, and to raise working capital.
4. Owing to missing data, however, all but Jo-Ann Fabrics drop out of the other
merchandize category.
5. We have only one retailer in each of these two categories. Thus, in what follows
we focus entirely on the difference in the use of percentage lease agreements by men's
apparel stores, gift and card shops, and home furnishings retailers.
6. We also simulated retail sales assuming average annualized rates of growth of 3,
5, and 7 percent per year over time. However, the choice of sales growth rates has little
effect on the overall performance of the model.
7. When  is defined based on current sales, the ratio of  to  is zero for 42 out of
the 100 retailers; it is between 0 and 100 percent for 51 retailers; and exactly equal to 100
percent for seven retailers. In contrast, when  is defined based on current and future sales,
the ratio of  to  is zero for 21 out of the 100 retailers; it is between 0 and 100 percent for
53 retailers; and exactly equal to 100 percent for 26 retailers.
8. In addition, if, as is perhaps reasonable to suppose, the preference function
common to each retailer exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion, then retailers with larger
assets (and hence larger net worth) will prefer to use less percentage leases. Such behavior
is consistent with the belief that wealthier retailers can afford to take larger risks (i.e., more
fixed lease payments) with their investments.
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Appendix
Table 1
Mean summary statistics by size of tenant
Size of
Tenant
(square
feet)

0-1,500
1,5012,500
2,5013,500
3,5015,000
5,0017,500
7,50110,000
Over
10,000
Total

(1)
No. of
Observations

(2)
Base
Rent
Persquare
foot

(3)
Overage
Rent
Persquare
foot

(4)
Total
Rent
Persquare
foot

(5)
Overage
Rent, %
of Total
Rent

(6)
% of
Leases
paying
Overage
Rents

(7)
Sales
Persquare
foot

(8)
Ratio of
Sales
Breakpoint
to Actual
Sales

184
156

29.51
20.42

2.27
3.12

31.79
23.54

6.33
11.32

30.98
42.31

375
356

1.42
1.22

148

17.52

2.36

19.89

9.05

31.76

286

1.42

140

16.63

2.29

18.93

9.31

35.00

271

1.43

140

16.63

2.29

18.93

9.31

35.00

271

1.43

14

13.47

0.61

14.09

4.23

14.29

220

1.49

14

14.25

1.71

15.96

8.48

28.57

229

1.25

725

20.69

2.44

23.13

8.76

33.79

319

1.38
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Table 2
Distribution of D/A ratios by merchandize type
Merchandize Type

Family apparel (n =11)
Specialty apparel (n =3)
Men’s apparel (n =11)
Women’s apparel (n =8)
Women’s specialty apparel (n =6)
Shoes (n =26)
Gifts and cards (n =5)
Jewelry (n =5)
Restaurant (n =2)
Home furnishings (n =1)
Leisure and entertainment (n=13)
Drug and variety (n =5)
Services and optical (n =1)
Other (n =1)
Total (n =100)
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Mean
D/A Ratio
49
67
43
60
63
47
43
48
42
44
46
46
38
48
48

Percent of Each Merchandize Type
D/A
D/A
D/A Ratio 0.25
Ratio <0.25
Ratio 0.50
and
D/A Ratio <0.50
0
55
45
0
0
100
0
91
9
0
0
100
0
17
83
0
65
35
0
80
20
0
50
50
33
0
67
0
80
20
8
54
38
0
80
20
0
100
0
0
100
0
2
56
42

Table 3
Estimates of the effect of firm characteristics on the use of percentage lease agreements
(t-values reported in parentheses)
Yi Based on Current Sales
Yi Based on Current and Future
Sales
(1)
(2)
(3)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Intercept
-5.93
7.35
-9.05
-1.78
-1.94
-2.93
(-6.38)
(7.63)
(-12.23)
(-1.28)
(-1.47)
(-3.12)
D/A ratio
27.60
33.22
31.55
19.88
19.43
18.99
(7.20)
(8.38)
(8.00)
(6.21)
(5.83)
(5.49)
(D/A ratio)2
-39.35
-47.91
-102.69
-4.56
-4.47
-33.45
(-2.71)
(-3.51)
(-13.21)
(-0.05)
(-0.48)
(-1.93)
D/E ratio
0.78
1.24
19.29
-8.54
-8.42
-1.01
(0.01)
(0.02)
(4.46)
(-1.18)
(-1.14)
(-0.01)
(D/E ratio)2
0.72
0.79
-1.51
1.98
1.96
0.76
(0.33)
(0.38)
(-1.16)
(2.36)
(2.31)
(0.29)
ASSETS
4.04E-04
1.58E-05 -1.53E-04 -5.22E-05 -8.72E-05 -1.72E-04
(0.33)
(0.05)
(-3.47)
(-0.57)
(-1.52)
(-4.69)
(ASSETS)2
-1.81E-09
1.59E-10
5.03E-09
4.25E-09
6.57E-09
9.12E-09
(-0.11)
(0.01)
(0.76)
(0.61)
(1.40)
(2.59)
SIZE
52.61
75.28
74.76
83.42
(4.04)
(7.88)
(7.23)
(8.81)
(SIZE)2
-1417.90
-1548.60
-29.79
-2964.10
(-1.98)
(-2.43)
(-7.14)
(-7.08)
Men’s apparel
-0.61
-0.59
-0.61
-0.36
-0.35
-0.37
(-6.87)
(-6.48)
(-6.89)
(-3.20)
(-3.08)
(-3.28)
Gifts and cards
-5.97
-6.03
-6.54
-1.30
-1.28
-1.45
(-0.01)
(-0.01)
(-0.01)
(-3.96)
(-3.92)
(-4.89)
Drug and variety
-0.59
-0.64
-0.68
-0.32
-0.08
-0.10
(-1.74)
(-1.70)
(-1.94)
(-0.70)
(-0.03)
(-0.05)
0.010
0.005
1
(18.67)
(5.25)
Summary
Statistics:
Log likelihood
-425.45
-449.76
-440.16
-462.11
-456.46
-453.82
Pseudo R2
0.98
0.99
0.99
0.98
0.99
0.99
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